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CABLE TELEVISION AND COPYRIGHT: CAN THE
STATES PROTECT THE BROADCASTERS?
In an era of rapid inventive development, statutes which affect
the uses and applications of technological advancements must either
be amenable to interpretations by the courts which accommodate
innovation or must be regularly revised by the legislatures. Otherwise
such statutes lose their vitality and cease to function as they were
originally designed. The Federal Copyright Act' is such a statute. The
present copyright statute was enacted in 1909 and has not been exten-
sively revised since then. 2 Such devices as computers, tape recorders,
photocopiers, and televisions, which today are taken for granted, were
unknown to the general public in the first decade of this century and
were, of course, not contemplated by the drafters of the copyright
laws. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the decades since the
enactment of the Copyright Act, courts have encountered a myriad
of problems in their attempts to apply the outdated Act to current
situations. Understandably, application of the 1909 Act to television
has required considerable judicial extension of the statutory lan-
guage; this expansion may have reached its limit in the recent Su-
preme Court case of Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc.3 This decision permits cable television4 system operators
'17 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970).
'Revision has been under consideration for at least two decades but a revision bill
has yet to be enacted. See text accompanying notes 46-49 infra.
1415 U.S. 394 (1974).
"'Cable television" denotes the business enterprise of transmitting television pro-
gramming to paying subscribers by means of coaxial cable. A cable television system
typically includes one or more large, efficient antennas, "head end" equipment consist-
ing of amplification and modulation devices, and miles of cable connecting the appara-
tus to television receivers owned by paying subscribers. Many systems also have studio
and other facilities for "cablecasting," or program origination. The cable system re-
ceives broadcast television signals off-the-air by means of the antennas, transmits
those signals to its "head end" equipment by means of cable or microwave link,
depending on the distance from the antennas to the cable system's station, amplifies
and modulates those signals and transmits them to subscribers. In addition to the
carriage of broadcast television signals, many cable systems originate a certain amount
of programming varying from automated time and weather service to substantive
programming such as sporting events, movies, and news reports.
The FCC requires a certain amount of cablecasting of original programming by
cable systems with 3,500 or more subscribers. 47 C.F.R. § 76.201(a) (1973).
Cable television now reaches an estimated seven and a half million subscribers
serviced by approximately 2,900 cable systems and the industry is rapidly growing.
Hearings on S. 1361 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 408, 415 (1973) (Testimony
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to transmit copyrighted programs for profit without paying any li-
cense fees to the copyright proprietors by denying broadcasters and
copyright holders any protection from such cable carriage under the
current Copyright Act.
The denial of federal statutory copyright protection to broadcast-
ers and copyright holders in the area of cable television transmission
of broadcast programming may have significant detrimental eco-
nomic results in the field of television broadcasting. Broadcasters and
copyright holders are financially affected by the shifts in viewer mar-
kets caused by cable television transmission of programming not nor-
mally receivable in the cable community. This potential dislocation
of traditional industry-market relationships may work a hardship on
local broadcasters and program copyright holders which, in the long
run, could adversely affect the entire television industry. If a genu-
inely detrimental economic impact can be established, the broadcast-
ers and copyright holders should be entitled to some form of relief.
However, because of the holding in Teleprompter, the broadcasters
and copyright holders will not be afforded a remedy under federal law
until Congress updates the language of the copyright statute, thus
settling the issues raised by cable television. Without federal protec-
tion, broadcasters and copyright holders can turn only to the states
if they hope to gain relief.
The states may be able to supply a remedy to broadcasters and
copyright holders provided such relief is not pre-empted because it
conflicts with federal policies in the areas of copyright and telecom-
munications. State laws conflicting with federal goals in those areas
of the law would be invalid under the supremacy clause of the Consti-
tution.5 However, a state remedy under the unfair competition doc-
and statement of David H. Foster, president of the National Cable Television Associa-
tion); SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE: THE TELEVISION
OF ABUNDANCE, REPORT OF THE SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 30-34
(1971).
For the Federal Communications Commission definition of "cable television" see
47 C.F.R. § 76.5(a) (1973). The FCC and the courts have referred to these operations
as community antenna television, "CATV", but due to the changing nature of services
offered by the systems, the FCC has begun to refer to them as "cable television." For
the reasons underlying this change see FCC CABLE TELEVISION REPORT AND ORDER, 36
F.C.C. 2D 143, 144 n.9 (1972) [hereinafter cited as CABLE TELEVISION REPORT AND
ORDER]. The term "cable television" more accurately reflects the function served.
5U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy clause provides that:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not-
withstanding.
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trine of misappropriation' might complement rather than contravene
federal policies, and therefore be permissible. The misappropriation
doctrine condemns certain unauthorized commercial uses of literary,
dramatic, musical, and other intellectual works, and since cable tele-
vision transmits for profit copyrighted programs produced by others,
such uncompensated transmission may be open to attack on the basis
of misappropriation.
The question of state protection for broadcasters has arisen be-
cause of the narrow construction the courts have given to the lan-
guage of the current copyright law. Sections 1(c) and (d) of the Copy-
right Act, worded by its drafters with live stage productions in mind,
grant copyright holders the exclusive right to "perform" their literary
and dramatic works. 7 The language of the Act therefore had to be
extended judicially in order to be applied to the electronic media. In
deciding the cable television-copyright issue, the question is therefore
whether or not a cable television system, in receiving, amplifying and
transmitting copyrighted television programming to paying subscri-
bers, "performs" the copyrighted works and is hence liable to copy-
right holders for infringement.'
Chief Justice Stone, writing for the Court in Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.,
317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942), said: "It is familiar doctrine that the prohibition of a federal
statute may not be set at naught, or its benefits denied, by state statutes or state
common law rules."
'The misappropriation doctrine protects owners of literary and other intellectual
works from certain unauthorized uses. See text accompanying notes 59-63 infra.
117 U.S.C. §§ 1(c)-(d) (1970). The exclusive rights granted to copyright holders in
§ 1 include, in part, the right:
(c) To deliver, authorize the delivery of, read, or present the copy-
righted work in public for profit if it be a lecture, sermon, address or
similar production, or other nondramatic literary work ... and to
play or perform it in public for profit ....
(d) To perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be a
drama or, if it be a dramatic work and not reproduced in copies for
sale, to vend any manuscript or any record whatsoever thereof; to
make or to procure the making of any transcription or record thereof
by or from which, in whole or in part, it may in any manner or by any
method be exhibited, performed, represented, produced, or reprod-
uced; and to exhibit, perform, represent, produce or reproduce it in
any manner or by any method whatsoever ....
Id.
An investigation of the 1909 Act's "legislative history shows that the intention of
Congress was directed to the situation where the dialogue of a play is produced by
another party with the aid of [a] transcript." Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 395 n.15 (1968); H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess.
4 (1909).
"Although the Copyright Act does not contain an explicit definition of "infringe-
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The Supreme Court has twice considered the issue of whether
cable television carriage of copyrighted broadcast programs consti-
tutes infringement. Each time the Court has found no infringement,
holding that .cable television does not "perform" copyrighted works
within the meaning of the Copyright Act. The first of these cases was
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.' Fortnightly oper-
ated cable systems in hilly areas of West Virginia and carried broad-
cast television signals which most of its subscribers would not nor-
mally have been able to receive by means of ordinary roof-top anten-
nas. United Artists Television held the copyrights on several motion
pictures which were broadcast by those television stations whose sig-
nals were carried by Fortnightly. The cable system had not been
licensed to transmit the copyrighted programs, and United Artists
Television therefore sued for infringement. 0
The Supreme Court determined that the function of cable televi-
sion within the entire process of television broadcasting and reception
was the key to the issue of infringement." In examining the Fort-
nightly operations, the Court found that the cable systems did no
more than enhance the ordinary viewer's ability to receive the broad-
cast television signals embodying the copyrighted motion pictures.
Hence, the function the cable system apparatus served was essen-
tially the same as that of the equipment generally supplied by the
private television viewer.2 The Court then established a broadcaster-
ment," it is settled that unauthorized use of copyrighted material inconsistent with
the "exclusive rights" enumerated in § 1, constitutes copyright infringement under the
federal law. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394
398 n.2 1974; 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 100 at 376 (1974).
'392 U.S. 390 (1968).
1°Id. at 391-93. Indeed, several of the license agreements between United Artists
Television and the broadcast stations specifically prohibited cable carriage of the
copyrighted motion pictures.
"The district court found for the copyright holder. United Artists Television, Inc.
v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The court of appeals affirmed.
The test applied was "quantitative"; in determining whether Fortnightly had "per-
formed" the copyrighted works the court asked "how much did [Fortnightly] do to
bring about the viewing and hearing of a copyrighted work?" United Artists Television,
Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 377 F.2d 872, 877 (2d Cir. 1967) (emphasis added). The
Second Circuit then examined Fortnightly's operation of the cable systems and found
that the antennas, sophisticated "head end" equipment, and miles of cable connecting
the apparatus with the subscribers' television sets was, when taken together, a suffi-
cient basis under this "quantitative" approach for a finding that Fortnightly's activi-
ties constituted "performance." Id. at 878. The Supreme Court rejected this test,
stating that such a standard could conceivably also make retailers and manufacturers
of television sets liable for copyright infringement. 392 U.S. at 397.
'2The Fortnightly Court stated that:
Essentially, a CATV system no more than enhances the viewer's ca-
CABLE TELEVISION
viewer dichotomy, holding that broadcasters "perform" within the
meaning of the Copyright Act, while viewers do not. Applying this
rule to the facts of the case, the Court determined that cable systems
were functionally like ordinary viewers and thus fell on the viewers'
side of the line. Therefore, the cable systems had not "performed"
and were not liable for copyright infringement.'
3
The cable television-statutory copyright controversy arose again
and was finally settled, with regard to the right to "perform" ac-
corded copyright holders by the present Federal Copyright Act, in
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc." CBS
instituted the suit on a claim similar to that of United Artists Televi-
sion in Fortnightly,5 but attempted to distinguish that case and
thereby limit the Fortnightly holding to its facts.'6 The cable systems
operated by Teleprompter 7 offered several services which the Fort-
nightly systems had not, and CBS contended that these additional
activities placed Teleprompter on the broadcasters' "side of the line,"
making Teleprompter, unlike Fortnightly, liable for copyright in-
fringement. The activities engaged in by Teleprompter and cited by
CBS to distinguish the Fortnightly operations were: (1) program ori-
pacity to receive the broadcaster's signals; it provides a well-located
antenna with an efficient connection to the viewer's television set. It
is true that a CATV system plays an "active" role in making reception
possible in a given area, but so do ordinary television sets and anten-
nas.
392 U.S. at 399 (footnote omitted).
"Id. at 400-01.
"Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 355 F. Supp. 618
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 476 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
"CBS was one of four plaintiffs. The others were independent producers of televi-
sion programs who copyrighted their shows and then licensed them to CBS and other
broadcasters. CBS produced and copyrighted certain programs itself and was a licen-
see of other copyrighted material. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Teleprompter
Corp., 355 F. Supp. at 619-20.
'TLhe action in Teleprompter was commenced in 1964, while Fortnightly was still
pending. Both suits were filed in the District Court for the Southern District of New
York and efforts were made to consolidate the two cases for purposes of litigation.
These efforts were unsuccessful, however, so the proceedings in Teleprompter were
stayed pending the outcome of Fortnightly. The plaintiffs in Teleprompter were al-
lowed to file supplemental pleadings which attempted to distinguish Teleprompter's
activities from those of Fortnightly. The trial in Teleprompter on the issue of copyright
infringement was held in September 1971. Id. at 620.
"By agreement of the parties, five of the Teleprompter cable systems were chosen,
for purposes of the litigation, to illustrate the nature and extent of Teleprompter's
operations. These systems were those in New York City; Elmira, New York; Farming-
ton, New Mexico; Great Falls, Montana; and Rawlins, Wyoming. Id. at 619.
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gination; (2) importation of distant signals; (3) selection of program-
ming; (4) microwave transmission; (5) interconnection with other
cable systems; (6) advertising with an emphasis on Teleprompter's
cablecasting; and (7) sale of commercials."8
The trial court dispensed first with those functions which it found
to be of minor significance to the overall nature of Teleprompter's
operation and which, in the court's view, had little bearing on the
issue of copyright liability: microwave transmission,19 interconnec-
tion, 20 advertising and sale of commercials, 2' and selection of pro-
gramming.22 However, the court found Teleprompter's other activi-
ties to be more problematical.
The Supreme Court in Fortnightly had found that the topography
of the area surrounding the communities served by the Fortnightly
cable systems made it difficult or impossible for most ordinary roof-
top antennas in the immediate locale to receive five of the stations
carried on the cable. As a consequence, the Teleprompter trial court
concluded that "Teleprompter's importation of signals not receivable
on rooftop antennas [was] no different from that in Fortnightly.'"3
1Id. at 620, 621-24.
"Teleprompter used microwave transmission to import broadcast signals from
great distances. The trial court found these microwave links to be "completely analo-
gous to the use of cable as a connecting carrier." Id. at 625.
2OThe interconnection between cable systems was made only for carriage of two
boxing matches, and the trial court stated that this special service on these two sepa-
rate and temporary occasions did not transform the cable systems into a broadcast
network as CBS had suggested. Id.
21The emphasis on "cablecasting," or program origination, in its advertising, and
the sale of a few commercials by Teleprompter were not, the court ruled, of "decisive
significance." Id. at 626.
12The district court also compared Teleprompter's choice of which broadcast sta-
tions its systems would carry to the choice made by an ordinary viewer of which
channel would be watched. Id. at 623.
2Id. at 627. It should be noted that there is a distinction to be made between the
signals carried by Fortnightly and those imported by Teleprompter. The greatest dist-
ance a signal was carried by Fortnightly was eighty-two miles, from Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania to Clarksburg, West Virginia. Further, the Fortnightly antennas were located
adjacent to the communities they served. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Televi-
sion, Inc., 392 U.S. at 392. Teleprompter, on the other hand, carried signals from Los
Angeles to Farmington, New Mexico, a distance of over six hundred miles. The signals
were received off-the-air at an antenna located forty-seven miles from Los Angeles and
carried by microwave link over a circuitous 1300 mile route to the cable station in
Farmington. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 355 F. Supp.
at 622. The cable system at Great Falls also imported signals by the same procedure,
carrying broadcasting from Salt Lake City, Utah (466 miles) and Spokane, Washington
(226 miles), among others. Id. at 623.
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However, it was with respect to program origination24 that the trial
court found the "most striking difference between [Teleprompter
and Fortnightly] ."5 In originating programming such as news, sports
and weather reporting, movies, and sporting events, the court found
that Teleprompter's cable systems were functioning as broadcasters.
This "cablecasting"26 activity was viewed by the court, however, as
being separate and distinct from the carriage of broadcast signals and
therefore unrelated to the issue of copyright liability for receiving
programming off-the-air and then transmitting it to cable subscri-
bers.27 Finding no grounds upon which to distinguish Teleprompter's
systems from those in Fortnightly, the court dismissed the action.
On appeal, the Second Circuit 28 agreed with the- court below on
all but one point: that cable carriage of imported or "distant" sig-
nals-those not receivable on roof-top antennas-opens the cable sys-
tem to statutory copyright liability.2 In discussing the issue of distant
2The cable systems in Fortnightly transmitted messages by video scanner, but
carried no other programming of their own. United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fort-
nightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. at 197. The Teleprompter systems, on the other hand,
originated automatic weather and time transmissions around-the-clock, and to differ-
ent extents, also originated substantive programming. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 355 F. Supp. at 621. This substantive cablecasting varied
from a few hours a week at Elmira to seventy hours a week in New York City, as of
March 31, 1971. Id. at 629.
21Id. at 628.
11"Cablecasting" is programming carried by a cable system, exclusive of broadcast
signals. 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(v) (1973).
21355 F. Supp. at 629.
21476 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1973).
"Id. at 350. The term "distant signal" is subject to several definitions. At one time,
the FCC considered a signal "distant" in locations beyond a given broadcast television
station's "Grade B contour." The Grade B contour for a broadcast station marks the
boundary along which acceptable reception of the station's signal can be expected 90%
of the time at 50% of the receiver locations. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 401 n.7 (1974); 47 C.F.R. § § 73.683-84 (1973). In cable
television regulations adopted in 1972, the FCC announced a narrower definition of
"distant signal" for purposes of signal carriage by cable systems. Signals available in
a community as a result of the authorized rebroadcast of a "translator" station and
signals found by the FCC to be "significantly viewed" in the community were treated
as local signals for purposes of the carriage regulations. 47 C.F.R. § § 76.59, 76.61, 76.63
(1973). For the definition of a television "translator" station see 47 C.F.R. § 74.701(a)
(1973). For the listing of "significantly viewed" signals by communities, see Appendix
B to the cable television regulations, 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.1 et seq. (1973). The Second
Circuit found these definitions to be unsuitable for copyright purposes, because "any
definition phrased in terms of what can be received in area homes using rooftop anten-
nas would fly in the face of the mandate of Fortnightly." 476 F.2d at 350. In attempting
to frame a suitable definition, the Second Circuit found that:
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signals, the Second Circuit quoted from United States v. Southwest-
ern Cable Co.3" in which the Supreme Court made the following dis-
tinction:
CATV systems perform either or both of two functions.
First, they may supplement broadcasting by facilitating satis-
factory reception of local stations in adjacent areas in which
such reception would not otherwise be possible; and second,
they may transmit to subscribers the signals of distant stations
entirely beyond the range of local antennae.
3 1
The circuit court held that in transmitting distant signals, a cable
system was the functional equivalent of a broadcaster, and therefore
"performed" those copyrighted programs embodied in the imported
signals. The court reasoned that by importing signals not otherwise
receivable in the community, a cable system did more than merely
enhance its subscribers' ability to receive signals already in the area.
32
Such an importation was the equivalent of broadcasting, and to
broadcast is to "perform" within the meaning of the Copyright Act.
3
However, the right to perform belongs exclusively to the copyright
holder or his licensee. Therefore by importing distant signals carrying
copyrighted programs without authorization, Teleprompter was
guilty of statutory copyright infringement.
In considering the case on appeal, the Supreme Court 34 agreed
with the courts below that the new functions performed by Tele-
prompter of program origination, sale of commercials and inter-
connection, even though they may have allowed Teleprompter to
compete more effectively for the television market, were of no signifi-
cance with regard to the copyright infringement issue of whether a
"performance" had occurred. 5 The Court found that these activities
were distinct from those involved in the reception and transmission
[Ilt is easier to state what is not a distant signal than to state what
is a distant signal. Accordingly, we have concluded that any signal
capable of projecting, without relay or retransmittal, an acceptable
image that a CATV system receives off-the-air during a substantial
portion of the time by means of an antenna erected in or adjacent to
the CATV community is not a distant signal.
Id. at 351 (footnote omitted).
"392 U.S. 157 (1968).
"'Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 476 F.2d at 349 quoting
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 163.
11476 F.2d at 349.
3See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.
31Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
1Id. at 405.
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of copyrighted works. These activities therefore did not change the
functional role of cable television in such transmissions of broadcast
programming from that of a viewer to that of a broadcaster and
thereby transform the cable reception service into a "performance."
While the cable system was comparable to a broadcaster in originat-
ing programming and selling commercials, such activities did not
change the overall nature of Teleprompter's function so as to move
it to the broadcasters' "side of the line" with regard to distant signal
carriage, thereby opening Teleprompter to liability for copyright in-
fringement for importing broadcast signals.
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the Second Circuit's
holding that the importation of distant signals by a cable system
gives rise to liability for copyright infringement. The Teleprompter
Court distinguished Southwestern Cable, as it had been relied upon
by the Second Circuit,36 on the grounds that it was not a copyright
case.37 The Court held that even though the signals imported by the
Teleprompter cable systems came from a greater distance than those
receivable by a home antenna, the systems' basic function, and there-
fore their status as non-broadcasters, remained unchanged.38
The Court's holding, allowing cable systems to import program-
ming free of charge, constituted a rejection of the television industry's
economic argument. CBS urged that the financial impact of cable
television carriage of imported signals be considered by the Court in
determining the issue of copyright liability. The argument was that
copyright holders could not expect to recoup their entire investment
from a single broadcast. Copyright holders often license their pro-
grams for "first run" showing over a major network, and later syndi-
cate the programs for airing by independent broadcast stations or
network affiliates in television markets not reached by the original
broadcast. The copyright holders in Teleprompter contended that
"See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
3rhe issue in Southwestern Cable was the authority of the FCC to regulate, in
the public interest, the operations of cable television systems. As the Teleprompter
Court said:
Insofar as the language quoted [by the Second Circuit from
Southwestern Cable to distinguish between the functions of cable tele-
vision] had other than a purely descriptive purpose, it was related
only to the issue of regulatory authority of the Commission. In that
context it did not and could not purport to create any separation of
functions with significance for copyright purposes.
415 U.S. at 406 (footnote omitted).
31415 U.S. at 408-09. The Court found the greater distances involved in Telepromp-
ter's activities to be immaterial. Teleprompter was still acting primarily as a reception
service, and not as a broadcaster.
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cable systems would diminish the profitability of the programs when
they were later syndicated by importing first run programming into
these "secondary" markets.3 The price a broadcaster will be willing
to pay for the right to air a program is related to the advertising
revenue the show will produce, and such revenue in turn depends
upon the number of viewers who tune in the program. Once a viewer
has seen a copyrighted program by means of cable television a later
licensed broadcast of the same show by the local station is less attrac-
tive.
Such a result, it was argued, would disrupt the economic structure
of the broadcast industry and would serve to dissuade potential pro-
gram producers from creating new shows, lest they receive an unsatis-
factory return on their investment. Only if the cable systems were
required to pay for the disruption caused would "the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors" be assured. 0 How-
ever, the Court was not persuaded by the argument, finding the eco-
nomic relationship in the television industry betweeri copyright hold-
ers and the general public is indirect and that the 'dilution of viewer
markets would not have the direct economic impact foreseen by the
copyright holders.'
The Teleprompter Court also held that the cable systems did not
assume a broadcast function by making choices as to which distant
signals would be carried. CBS argued that by "leapfrogging" closer
broadcast stations and choosing to carry signals more distant, the
cable systems were selecting programming, a function ascribed to
broadcasters in Fortnightly. The Teleprompter Court stated, how-
ever, that broadcasters make a creative choice in selecting individual
programs and devising schedules for broadcasts, while cable systems
only make the initial decision of which signals are to be carried.
Thereafter, these systems simply carry without editing the programs
they receive, making no further programming decisions.2
3 A "secondary" market, in this instance, would be one in which a copyright holder
could hope to license his program subsequent to its first run major network showing.
4415 U.S. at 410-11. No specific findings of fact had been made by the trial court
on the economic impact of the importation of distant signals on broadcasters and
copyright holders. Id. at 413 n.15. For a discussion of the economic effects of distant
signal importation on advertiser markets available to broadcast television stations see
Note, CATV and Copyright Liability, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1514, 1522-25 (1967); Note,
CA TV and Copyright Liability: On a Clear Day You Can See Forever, 52 VA. L. REv.
1505, 1513-16 (1966).
11415 U.S. at 411-12. The Court stated that even had such an economic result been
established, it was of little relevance to the narrow issue of whether the importation of
distant signals constituted a "performance." Id. at 413 n.15.
1Id. at 409-10.
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Having settled the issue as to which side of the broad-
caster-viewer line cable television systems fall, the Court concluded
that Teleprompter had not "performed" any copyrighted programs
and reversed the Second Circuit's holding that cable television im-
portation of distant signals constituted "performance" and hence
entailed copyright liability for carriage of imported programming.
The effect of the Court's decision that the transmission of television
programming by cable is not a "performance" is to grant cable sys-
tem operators immunity from liability under the Federal Copyright
Act, for without a "performance" there is no copyright infringe-
ment.43
The Supreme Court's decisions allowing cable system operators to
profit by transmitting copyrighted works without accountability to
the copyright proprietors, an activity characterized as "piracy" by
Mr. Justice Douglas," is the result of the application of the anti-
quated Copyright Act to a modern communications innovation. As
Mr. Justice Fortas said in Fortnightly, applying a 1909 copyright law
to a medium that was not in existence at the time of its enactment
"calls not for the judgment of Solomon but for the dexterity of
Houdini."45 The urging by commentators for congressional action to
update the provisions of the Copyright Act has recently intensified,46
particularly as the problems of interpreting the 1909 Act to fit new
situations created by advancing technology have increased. Indeed,
all three courts which considered the Teleprompter case urged an
expeditious legislative resolution of the issues presented by cable
television's carriage of copyrighted programs.47 However, the congres-
4See text accompanying note 8 supra.
"Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. at 418 (Doug-
las, J., dissenting).
15392 U.S. at 402 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
"Several commentators exploring the issue raised in the Teleprompter decision
have called for congressional resolution of the problems of balancing the competing
interests of copyright, national telecommunications policy and the technological ad-
vancement generated by the important communications device, cable television. See,
e.g., Note, CATV and Copyright Liability: Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc. and the Consensus Agreement, 25 HAST. L.J. 1507, 1544-48 (1974);
Comment, The Cable Compromise: Integration of Federal Copyright and Telecom-
munications Policies, 17 ST. Louis U. L. J. 340, 353-54 (1973); Comment, Copyright
Law and CATV: Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 60 VA.
L. REv. 137, 152-53 (1974).
"Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 414
(1974); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 476 F.2d 338, 354 (2d
Cir. 1973); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 355 F. Supp. 618,
630 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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sional response to these repeated calls for action has been somewhat
dilatory.
Comprehensive revision of the 1909 Act has been under considera-
tion for at least two decades. In 1955, Congress authorized the Copy-
right Office to make studies of possible changes. Six years later the
Office issued a report containing its determinations. Beginning with
the Eighty-eighth Congress, revision bills have been regularly intro-
duced,4" but none has yet been enacted. The difficult problems raised
by cable television have been some of the most significant obstacles
to passage of the revision bills." The industries involved, however,
have agreed in principle that enactment of a revision bill settling the
issue of cable television copyright liability is desirable and have at-
tempted to break the legislative impasse.
The impetus for the broadcasters and cable operators to reach an
agreement on copyright issues came largely from the Federal Com-
munications Commission. Following a "letter of intent" from Chair-
man Dean Burch of the FCC to the Senate Communications Subcom-
mittee51 concerning a proposed regulatory scheme for cable television,
and at the suggestion of Chairman Burch and Clay T. Whitehead,
Director of the Office of Telecommunications Policy, representatives
of both the broadcast and cable television interests negotiated a "con-
sensus agreement" embodying proposals acceptable to both sides on
copyright legislation and FCC regulation.5 2 The agreement included
a provision that all parties would support cable television copyright
"REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., (Comm. Print
1961), (reprinted in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 1199 (Arthur Fisher Mem. Ed. 1963)). This
report did not deal specifically with cable television, but it did recommend that a
performing license be required when a receiver made a charge to the public for the
reception of the broadcast.
4-H.R. 11947, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); H.R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965); S. 1006, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967); S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 644,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 1361, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 8186, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973). H.R. 2512, introduced in the Ninetieth Congress, passed the House
only after the section of the bill creating mandatory licensing for cable television was
deleted. 113 CONG. REc. 8992, 9021 (1967).
"'See 117 CONG. REc. 2001 (1971) (remarks of Senator McClellan).
5 Letter of Chairman Burch to Senate Communications Subcomm., August 5,
1971, in 31 F.C.C. 2d 115 (1971).
52CABLE TELEVISION REPORT AND ORDER, note 4 supra, Appendix D. For a critical
discussion of the "consensus agreement," see the dissenting opinion of Commissioner
Nicholas Johnson in CABLE TELEVISION REPORT AND ORDER at 306-23. The "consensus
agreement" has recently been attacked by certain spokesmen for the cable television
industry, and the continued vitality of the agreement seems doubtful. See note 55
infra.
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legislation and seek its early passage. The cable television industry
agreed that a provision should be made in any comprehensive revi-
sion bill to recompense copyright holders for carriage of their pro-
grams by cable. Compulsory licenses53 would be available for all local
signals, FCC authorized distant signals, and other signals which may
be carried under FCC regulations. 4
Despite these efforts, nearly three years have passed since the
"consensus agreement" was reached, yet Congress has not resolved
the cable television-copyright controversy. 5 Since Teleprompter
essentially grants the cable television interests immunity from action
under the 1909 Act, the copyright holders have no federal law to
assure compensation for use of their works by cable television as long
as the Federal Copyright Act remains unchanged. Until such time
as a revision bill becomes law,-7 copyright holders must look beyond
the federal government if they are to be assured compensation" for
cable transmission of their copyrighted works.
OUnder a compulsory licensing arrangement cable television would be allowed to
carry any or all of certain categories of stations chosen by the FCC on the basis of local
and significantly viewed signals. The cable systems would be required to pay the
broadcasters specified royalties for the license to do so. See S. 1361, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 111(c)(1) (1973) (reprinted at 120 CONG. REc. 16,170 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1974)).
"
4
CABLE TELEVISION REPORT AND ORDER at 285.
'The Senate passed S. 1361 in September 1974. The bill contained provisions for
compulsory licenses for cable carriage of certain signals, and imposed infringement
liability for the carriage of others. 120 CONG. REc. 16,167, 16,170 (daily ed. Sept. 9,
1974). However, Senator McClellan stated that it was doubtful that the House would
have time to act before the bill dies at the end of the Ninety-third Congress. Id. at
16,185-86 (remarks of Senator McClellan). The revision bill faces difficult opposition.
The cable industry, led by the National Cable Television Association, withdrew its
support of S. 1361 in November 1974. The Association's primary complaints involved
the bill's method of determining copyright license fees to be charged cable operations,
the possibility of legal action by broadcasters, rather than copyright holders which
might lead to "undue harassment," and the Association's desire to exempt cable
systems with less than 1,500 subscribers from the provisions of the bill. One representa-
tive of the cable interests, Mr. Fred Ford, a former chairman of the FCC, has recom-
mended rescission of the consensus agreement altogether. BROADCASTING, Nov. 25,
1974, at 35.
mEven under FCC exclusivity regulations, cable television systems are allowed to
carry at least one signal embodying a particular copyrighted program receivable in
the cable community. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.91-.151 (1973).
57The current revision bill provides, with certain limitations, for federal pre-
emption of state laws granting copyright, literary property rights or other equivalent
legal or equitable rights. S. 1361, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 301(a) (1973) (reprinted at 120
CONG. REc. 16,174 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1974)).
"Copyright holders and broadcasters level two economic arguments against cable
transmission of broadcast programming, particularly the importation of distant sig-
nals. First, the availability of non-local programming made possible by cable importa-
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In the absence of a federal remedy, the broadcasters and copyright
holders may turn to state law in seeking protection from the detri-
mental economic effects of cable transmission of copyrighted broad-
cast programming. Where the Federal Copyright Act has proven not
to be amenable to the new problems created by changing technology,
state law may be more flexible. In seeking to protect themselves from
cable carriage of copyrighted programming, the broadcasters and
copyright holders may rely on the copyright-like protections afforded
by the state law doctrine of misappropriation.
The unfair competition doctrine of misappropriation59 provides
protection in tort from certain unauthorized uses of a commercially
valuable product. The doctrine as first announced by the Supreme
Court in International News Service v. Associated Press0 forbade the
appropriation of the work product of a competitor for commercial
purposes." However, the elements of the doctrine have evolved over
tion will tend to divert a certain number of viewers from local broadcasts. Since the
broadcasters' advertising rates and the copyright holders' license fees are both propor-
tional to the number (and characteristics) of viewers watching a program, this audi-
ence fragmentation will cause both groups to lose revenue. As cable systems increase
their amount of original cablecasting, the audience for local broadcast stations will be
further diminished, and the local broadcasters' competitive positions will be adversely
affected.
Second, when a cable system imports a program not normally receivable in the
cable community, the program will be less attractive to the local broadcaster should
the program's copyright holder subsequently attempt to license it in that market. As
a result of the previous cable transmission the viewer appeal of the program is lessened,
as it is essentially a rerun. The license fee a copyright holder could charge would be
diminished accordingly. For a critical analysis of these arguments see Note, CATVand
Copyright Liability: Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. and
the Consensus Agreement, 25 HAST. L.J. 1507, 1526-34 (1974).
59One commentator has suggested that misappropriation is no longer a theory of
unfair competition, but rather is more akin to common law copyright. Goldstein,
Federal System Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 49, 58-59, 67-68
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Federal System Ordering].
10248 U.S. 215 (1918).
61NS copied news releases prepared by AP from early editions of east coast news-
papers and public bulletin boards and transmitted the news thus obtained, either
unchanged or after rewriting, to INS customers for publication. The Court found that
AP had a "quasi-property" right in the news dispatches prepared, and ruled that INS
was liable to AP for misappropriating the news for commercial purposes. The Court
found that misrepresentation was not a necessary element of a case of misappropria-
tion. Id. at 231-40. Misrepresentation or "palming off" was one of the traditional
elements of unfair competition. See generally 1 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR
COMPETrITION TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 4.1 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as
CALLMANN]; Note, Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. REv.
933-34 (1964).
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the years to the point that the unauthorized direct use, such as dupli-
cation or mechanical reproduction, of another's literary or other intel-
lectual work for commercial purposes is sufficient to constitute mis-
appropriation. 2 The fact that the parties concerned in a misappro-
priation action are not in direct competition has been held, in some
jurisdictions, to be immaterial. 3
It would seem that broadcasters and copyright holders can make
a strong prima facie case of misappropriation. Cable television reve-
nues are generated by transmitting to paying subscribers the broad-
casters' signals embodying the copyright holders' programs. The in-
tellectual, physical, and financial effort required to produce and
broadcast television programming would appear sufficient to vest in
broadcasters the requisite "quasi-property" interest in their program-
ming protectible under a misappropriation theory.64 By transmitting
broadcast signals to paying subscribers, cable television makes a di-
rect use, without authority, of the broadcasters' and copyright hold-
ers' work product for commercial purposes,65 and is therefore misap-
"2See, e.g., Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc.
786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 489 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd mem., 279 App. Div. 632, 107
N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't 1951).
'5See, e.g., Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass.
1934) (applying Massachusetts law), modified on other grounds, 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 298 U.S. 670 (1935); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recor-
der Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd mem., 279 App. Div.
632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't 1951). In Metropolitan Opera the court said that the
modem view of the law of misappropriation "[d]oes not rest solely on the ground of
direct competitive injury, but on the broader principle that property rights of commer-
cial value are to be and will be protected from any form of unfair invasion or infringe-
ment . . . ." 101 N.Y.S.2d at 492. Traditionally, actual competition between the
parties was necessary before a claim for "unfair competition" could be established. See
CALLMANN at § 5.1.
"In International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), Mr. Justice
Pitney explained that AP had a protectible "quasi-property" interest in the news it
collected. The news was the stock in trade of both news bureaus, and was distributed
as a commercial venture. As both parties used the news to make a profit, the Court
found that by incurring considerable expense to gather the news, AP developed a
quasi-property interest as between itself and INS. This quasi-property interest be-
tween two parties was contrasted with a genuine property interest which protects its
holder against intrusions by anyone, not merely those who seek commercial advantage.
248 U.S. at 236.
"If the cable television context is one in which the courts should hold that actual
competition between the parties is still a necessary element of unfair competition, see,
e.g., Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250, 296
N.Y.S.2d 771 (1968), the broadcasters should still be able to present a prima facie case.
Local broadcasters compete with cable television distant signal importation and cable-
casting. Both imported programs and cable originated shows contend with local broad-
casts for the viewer market.
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propriating. However, despite the apparent suitability of the misap-
propriation doctrine as a basis for affording the lroadcasters and
copyright holders relief under state law, there is an additional ques-
tion which must be answered before any state law solution can be
seriously considered. The precise question is whether the states are
constitutionally able to grant relief in light of possible federal pre-
emption of the copyright field.
The federal government has a significant interest in matters of
copyright and telecommunications policies, and has sought to
achieve its goals by means of statutes and regulations. State laws
affecting copyright and telecommunication are valid only insofar as
they are in harmony with federal policy.68 State protection which
defeats federal objectives is invalid. In order to secure state-granted
relief, therefore, broadcasters and copyright holders must demon-
strate that the application of state misappropriation doctrine to the
cable-copyright controversy does not conflict with the purposes of
federal policies. As with other issues involving federalism, the ques-
tion of whether a state law affecting copyright and telecommuni-
cation has been pre-empted by federal activity in those fields is not
easily answered.
A delineation of the boundary between federal and state spheres
of power in the area of copyright law has been implied from the
companion cases of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.17 and Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc."5 The plaintiffs in Sears and
Compco sought to protect their federally unpatentable products from
being copied by competitors under a state unfair competition law.
The Supreme Court held such state-granted protection invalid, find-
ing that in drafting the patent laws Congress had consciously deter-
mined what amount of innovation was necessary before an invention
deserved patent protection. Thus those devices falling short of the
minimum standards were unprotectible. Congress, the Court stated,
had determined that those articles unworthy of a patent should be
"See note 5 supra.
61376 U.S. 225 (1964). The Stiffel Company, the holder of a design patent on the
popular "pole lamp," sued Sears for marketing a similar lamp. Sears was able to sell
its lamp at retail for approximately Stiffel's wholesale price. Stiffel's patent was held
invalid for want of invention. Id. at 225-26.
6376 U.S. 234 (1964). Day-Brite, who had secured a design patent on a particular
light fixture, sued Compco, whose predecessor had marketed an essentially identical
fixture. Day-Brite's patent, like Stiffel's, was held invalid. Id. at 234-35. For a discus-
sion of the Sears-Compco doctrine and its potential effect on state laws see Gamboni,
Unfair Competition Protection after Sears and Compco, 15 ASCAP COPYRGHT LAW
SYMPosIuM 1 (1967).
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freely accessible to the public and hence the states could not, under
the rubric of unfair competition, prohibit their being copied. The
Court's opinions in Sears and Compco were broadly worded and ex-
tended to copyright as well as patent law the rule that state legisla-
tive enactments may neither impinge upon subject areas covered by
federal legislation, nor conflict with federal objectives. 9
The expansive language of Sears-Compco has been applied in the
cable-copyright context. In Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc.,7" a local
broadcaster, KLIX-TV, in Twin Falls, Idaho, charged a cable system,
Cable Vision, with unfair competition and tortious interference with
contractual rights. KLIX had agreements with three broadcast televi-
sion stations which represented the major networks in Salt Lake City,
Utah, to rebroadcast their signals in Twin Falls. Due to topography
and distance, KLIX was the only broadcast station normally receiva-
ble in the community. Cable Vision erected a large antenna and other
equipment and began transmitting those same Salt Lake City signals
to its subscribers in Twin Falls. This multiplicity of signals diverted
viewers from KLIX's broadcasts. The trial court granted relief to the
broadcaster, finding the cable system liable for both unfair competi-
tion and tortious interference with contractual rights.
7'
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the lower court's judgment
and remanded the case.71 In disallowing relief for misappropriation,
the Ninth Circuit admitted that Cable Vision's use of broadcast sig-
nals for commercial purposes was "inconsistent with a finer sense of
propriety," but nevertheless held that the trial court had recognized
state law protections in contravention of the Sears-Compco
doctrine.7 3 The court of appeals recommended that the aggrieved
broadcaster seek to vindicate its interests in an action under statu-
tory or common law copyright.
74
"Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1964); Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964).
7211 F. Supp. 47 (D. Idaho 1962), vacated and remanded, 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965). The Supreme Court had decided Sears and
Compco only four months before the Ninth Circuit handed down its Cable Vision
decision. The district court's decision had been rendered in 1962, nearly two years
before.
1'211 F. Supp. at 58-59.
12Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964).
n335 F.2d at 352 quoting International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S.
215, 257 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In a case tried on similar facts, a Florida appellate
court affirmed the denial of state law relief to a broadcaster, relying exclusively on the
Ninth Circuit's Cable Vision opinion. Herald Publishing Co. v. Florida Antennavision,
Inc., 173 So. 2d 469 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
7335 F.2d at 353. The Ninth Circuit suggested that the broadcasters could be
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In Cable Vision the Ninth Circuit found Sears-Compco to be dis-
positive of the issue of the validity the state misappropriation and
contract protections as sought by the local broadcaster.75 Over the
last decade, however, the Sears-Compco doctrine has been seriously
eroded and limited. A combination of lower court circumventions and
Supreme Court limitations has done much to undermine the broad
holdings of the Sears-Compco opinions.
Several lower courts have relied on an omission in the Sears-
Compco decisions as a basis for easing the Supreme Court's proscrip-
tion against state protection in the area of copyright. Neither the
misappropriation doctrine nor International News Service v. Asso-
ciated Press, the Supreme Court case applying the doctrine, 6 were
specifically mentioned in Sears or Compco, and as a result, the lower
courts have carved out of the Sears-Compco doctrine an area of per-
missible state regulation. These courts have found "copying" and
"misappropriation" to be distinguishable, and have held that Sears-
Compco forbids only state prohibitions against "copying" and does
not extend to state regulation of "misappropriation."77
protected under statutory copyright, for programs so registered, and by common law
copyright, for those programs which had not been "published" within the meaning of
that doctrine, and are therefore still subject to common law copyright protection. For
a general discussion of common law copyright protection see 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§§ 10-11 (1974).
The Supreme Court has foreclosed any possibility of protection under statutory
copyright by its decisions in Fortnightly and Teleprompter, so long as the language of
the 1909 Act remains unchanged. Inasmuch as the Ninth Circuit's opinion was based
on the apprehension that state unfair competition protection would be a disincentive
to registration of copyrightable works under the federal law, these decisions have made
it clear that any remedy made available by the states will be in addition to those of
the Copyright Act. The attractiveness of the protections of the Act consequently re-
main, and the state remedy should therefore have no adverse affect on the number of
registrations under the federal law.
Common law copyright protects those works which are "unpublished." It has been
held that television programming is not eligible for common law copyright because
broadcasting serves as a divestitive publication. Z Bar Net, Inc. v. Helena Television,
Inc., 125 U.S.P.Q. 595 (Mont. Dist. Ct. 1960).
75335 F.2d at 351.
7 See note 61 supra.
"See, e.g., Tape Industries Ass'n of America v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340, 348-51
(C.D. Cal. 1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 902 (1971); Grove Press, Inc. v. Collectors
Publication, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603, 606-07 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Flamingo Telefilm Sales,
Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 141 U.S.P.Q. 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds,
22 App. Div. 2d 778, 254 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1st Dep't 1964); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest
Records, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 878, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553, 554-57 (Sup. Ct. 1964). Contra,
International Tape Mfrs. Ass'n v. Gerstein, 344 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Fla. 1972), vacated
and remanded, 494 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally Note, The "Copying-
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"Misappropriation" and "copying" might best be distinguished
by the extent to which an unauthorized use of a work draws upon the
investment of the original creator." One who uses mechanical reprod-
uction devices or other means of direct duplication to exploit the work
product of another for commercial purposes has misappropriated. On
the other hand, one who imitates the original, and who thereby incurs
many of the same expenses as did the original producer, merely "cop-
ies." The former activity has been seen in a more pejorative light
than has the latter and the courts have accordingly endeavored to
afford state protection from misappropriation in spite of Sears-
Compco.80 The copying-misappropriation distinction, however, is not
the strongest basis for the legitimacy of state protection in the copy-
right field.
The Supreme Court has found the state power to grant certain
copyright-like protections to be of constitutional magnitude. A state
statutory prohibition against misappropriation was upheld and the
applicability of Sears-Compco was limited by the Supreme Court in
Goldstein v. California,81 a landmark decision in the copyright field,
in which a state penal statute82 protecting uncopyrightable sound
Misappropriation" Distinction: A False Step in the Development of the Sears-Compco
Pre-emption Doctrine, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1444 (1971) [hereinafter cited as The
"Copying-Misappropriation" Distinction]. One commentator charges that even
though Sears and Compco dealt with unfair competition, they are obscure on the
matter of misappropriation because "the opinions reflect only a minimal appreciation
of [unfair competition's] subtleties." Federal System Ordering at 66.
19See The "Copying-Misappropriation" Distinction at 1445, 1460-63 and cases
cited therein.
7 The distinction can best be illustrated by example. The activity known as "tape
piracy" involves the direct duplication of tapes by means of multiple slave transcri-
bers. The pirate purchases a legitimate tape, reproduces it many times, and markets
it. Due to the savings in production expense he is able to undersell the original. This
is misappropriation. On the other hand, if the unauthorized use consists of hiring
musicians, renting a studio and employing recording technicians to produce an imita-
tion of the original recording, the activity would be merely copying. Compare Goldstein
v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) with Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435
F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970,) cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971). See generally Note, Gold-
stein v. California and the Protection of Sound Recordings: Arming the States for
Battle with the Pirates, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 604, 630-831 (1974). [hereinafter cited
as Goldstein v. California and the Protection of Sound Recordings.]
8°See cases cited in note 77 supra.
1412 U.S. 546 (1973). For discussions of Goldstein, see Note, Goldstein v. Califor-
nia: Validity of State Copyright Under the Copyright and Supremeacy Clauses, 25
HAST. L.J. 1196 (1974); Goldstein v. California and the Protection of Sound
Recordings; Comment, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1, 282-91 (1973).
2CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h(a)(1) (West 1970). This statute provides that one who
"[kinowingly and willfully transfers or causes to be transferred any sounds recorded
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recordings83 was held to be constitutional. The Court found that the
copyright clause 4 of the Constitution grants concurrent power to the
federal and state governments to extend copyright protection, so long
as state law does not conflict with federal policies.8s In reaching its
conclusions, the Court distinguished Sears-Compco on the ground
that they were patent law cases and that the congressional decision
to protect some inventions and not others which in the Court's view
mandated striking down state protection, was peculiar to patent mat-
ters and therefore was not determinative of the states' power to grant
copyright-like protection." The tape "piracy" prohibited by Califor-
on a phonograph record . . . tape . . . or other article on which sounds are recorded,
with intent to sell or cause to be sold . . . such article on which sounds are so trans-
ferred, without the consent of the owner [is guilty of a misdemeanor]."
13The case involved the business known as "tape piracy." The tape pirate pur-
chases a legitimate prerecorded tape and then duplicates it by means of mechanical
devices. The duplicated tapes are then marketed at a price below that of the original.
The pirate can undersell legitimate producers because he has avoided the costly
burden of producing an original recording by misappropriating the work. Such sound
recordings were uncopyrightable under the Federal Act before 1972. 412 U.S. at 548-
52.
"U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 grants to Congress the power "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
11412 U.S. at 558-59. Mr. Chief Justice Burger turned to The Federalist in his
analysis. Alexander Hamilton, in Number 32, mentioned three instances in which the
states can not exercise authority: when the Constitution expressly granted exclusive
authority to the federal government, when it granted authority to the federal govern-
ment and denied like authority to the states, and when it granted authority to the
federal government, "to which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely
and totally contradictory and repugnant." 412 U.S. at 553 quoting THE FEDERALIST No.
32, at 241 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (emphasis in original). The Chief Justice
found that the first two tests of exclusivity presented no problem, as the grant of
copyright power is neither expressly exclusive in the federal government, nor prohib-
ited to the states. 412 U.S. at 553. The third test was dealt with at length. Quoting
again from Hamilton, the Chief Justice noted: "It is not .. .a mere possibility of
inconvenience in the exercise of powers, but an immediate constitutional repugnancy
that can by implication alienate and extinguish a pre-existing right of [state] sover-
eignty." 412 U.S. at 554-55 quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 243 (B. Wright ed. 1961)
(A. Hamilton). Finding certain subject matter covered by the copyright clause to be
of purely local interest and not worthy of national attention, and seeing no constitu-
tional repugnancy to state granted copyright protection, the Court found copyright
power to be concurrent in both the federal and state governments. State copyright
protection is, however, only effective within the boundaries of the individual states.
412 U.S. at 558. The Court further found that the limitation in the copyright clause
that copyrights be granted for "limited Times" applies only to Congress, and not to
the states. Id. at 560. The effect of the California statute was to grant copyright-like
protection in perpetuity.
"Id. at 569-70. While Congress limited patent protection to only those inventions
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nia in Goldstein is a form of misappropriation, and in allowing the
state statute to stand, the Court breathed new life into that old
doctrine. But perhaps the more important aspect of the Goldstein
decision is the presumption in favor of the validity of state law with
which the Court approached the question of federal pre-emption of
the state statute affecting copyright matters. Sears-Compco created
a rule that state laws affecting works subject to federal copyright and
patent protection were per se pre-empted by the federal activity in
those areas." After Goldstein, however, state copyright-like protec-
tion will generally be assumed to be valid, unless it can be established
that Congress intended its enactments to be pre-emptive of such
state remedies."
In validating state protection of works uncopyrightable under the
federal statutory scheme, the Goldstein Court dealt a severe blow to
the vitality of the Sears-Compco doctrine of federal pre-emption. The
Court found that state action filling a vacuum in the federal statutory
copyright scheme was constitutionally proper. Shortly after deciding
Goldstein, the Court further limited the pre-emption doctrine of
Sears-Compco and found state remedies touching the federal protec-
tive framework to be constitutional. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp.,9 the Court upheld a state trade secret law that provided pro-
possessing at least a minimum of innovation, copyright protection extends to "all
writings" of an author. It was on this basis that the Goldstein Court distinguished
Sears-Compco. See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra. Yet despite Goldstein's ap-
parent rejection of the Sears-Compco doctrine in the copyright field, the Court inexpl-
icably expressly declared that those companion cases were reaffirmed. 412 U.S. at 571.
"See Federal System Ordering at 63-65.
wrhe presumption of the Sears-Compco Court on the issue of the validity of state
protections affecting copyright matters was that "congressional silence betokens a
determination that the benefits of competition outweigh the impediments placed on
creativity by the lack of copyright protection . . . ." Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
at 579 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Goldstein majority, on the other hand, found no
such affirmative intent in congressional silence with regard to a particular category of
writings. The Goldstein Court found pre-emption only in affirmative congressional
action, not inaction. See Goldstein v. California and the Protection of Sound
Recordings at 639-40.
Mr. Justice Marshall disagreed with the shift in the Court's presumption as to the
intent to be inferred from congressional silence when dealing with the issue of federal
pre-emption of state copyright-like protection. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
576-77 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See generally Comment, Goldstein v. Califor-
nia: Breaking Up Federal Copyright Preemption, 74 COLUM. L. Rxv. 960 (1974).
"416 U.S. 470 (1974). Harshaw Chemical Company, a division of Kewanee, had,
after more than sixteen years of experimentation, grown a commercially valuable
synthetic crystal to a size previously thought impossible. Several Harshaw employees
left the company to form their own business and within a matter of months had
equalled the Harshaw crystal with one of their own, a feat no other competitor had
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tection for federally patentable, but in fact unpatented, articles and
processes. As a result, the states may now enter the patent as well as
the copyright field, and may even protect articles which fall within
the scope of congressionally provided protections.
Thus, a trend away from the pre-emptive presumption of Sears-
Compco has emerged. First, in an effort to afford state protection, the
lower courts distinguished "misappropriation" from "copying" and
found the Sears-Compco doctrine applicable only to the latter. 0
Next, Goldstein approved a state misappropriation statute and deci-
sively opened the copyright enclave to state activity by shifting the
Court's presumption on the issue of state protection to one in favor
of the validity of state law. Finally, Kewanee has limited Sears-
Compco in its own patent field and struck down the rule that state
protection of a federally patentable item is per se pre-empted, by
holding that federal law is pre-emptive only when state protection
conflicts with congressional policy. In light of the reversal of the
Sears-Compco presumption that state laws affecting copyright inter-
ests are invalid, decisions such as Cable Vision which relied on the
strength of Sears-Compco must now be reassessed. Should a case
again arise on facts similar to those in Cable Vision, the judicial
analysis would necessarily be made in light of the reasoning underly-
ing the severe erosion of the federal pre-emption doctrine originally
announced in Sears-Compco.
In the process of limiting Sears-Compco, the Supreme Court has
looked to see if state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."9
As the current Copyright Act was passed before the advent of televi-
sion, Congress could, of course, have had no specific objectives with
regard to cable transmission of broadcast signals. Lacking any guid-
ance as to specific congressional intent in the area, the analysis must
therefore turn to the general purposes of the Copyright Act. The
congressional debates are of little assistance, as the 1909 Act was
rushed through Congress with little discussion on the floor of either
chamber.2 The House report 3 on the bill is more useful, but even it
accomplished. Kewanee then sued its former employees' new company, Bicron, for
violation of the Ohio trade secret law.
"See note 68 supra.
"Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974) 52, 67 quoting Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 32, 67 (1941) (emphasis added); accord, Goldstein v. Califor-
nia, 412 U.S. 546, 559 (1973).
"See 43 CONG. REc., 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 3746-47, 3765-69 (1909). The Act was
passed late in the evening of March 3, 1909. The Congress adjourned the following day.
The total debate on the floor of the House lasted only forty minutes. The proceedings
on the Senate floor were even more perfunctory.
'3H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909) (reprinted in 2 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT (1974) (Appendix I)).
CABLE TELEVISION
fails to outline specifically the overall objectives of the Congress in
enacting the legislation. Nevertheless, it is clear that Congress wished
to avoid the necessity of constant revision bills, so in drafting the 1909
Act it sought language that would be sufficiently elastic to insure that
emerging technology would be covered. Therefore, the broad term
"writings" was chosen to delimit the works which were to be subject
to copyright.94 The courts, however, have not read the Act quite as
expansively as Congress had intended and, therefore, certain gaps
have been created in the comprehensive coverage that the 1909 Con-
gress had envisioned, most notably in the television broadcasting
field."
In enacting the 1909 Copyright Act extending protection to "all
the writings of an author,"9 Congress was acting in pursuance of the
objective of the copyright clause of the Constitution, which is to
"promote the Progress of. . .useful Arts."97 The House report on the
Act stated that copyright legislation was not based on any natural
right an author had in his writings, because copyrights are purely
statutory in origin. Rather, the Act was intended to serve the public
welfare. The report said that copyright was not solely "for the benefit
of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the public'.9' Congress
found that the best method to promote the "useful Arts" was to
stimulate creation and dissemination of intellectual works by grant-
ing limited monopolies to authors. However, in deciding how exten-
sive these monopolies should be, Congress had to balance two com-
peting interests and reach a compromise. The monopoly granted to
copyright holders had to be sufficiently rewarding economically to
"1H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1909).
"See, e.g., Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390
(1968). See also Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir.
1955) (no copyright protection for sound recordings under the Federal Act). The Copy-
right Office has also ruled certain works to be uncopyrightable, such as names, titles,
slogans, and forms such as time cards, bank checks and address books. 37 C.F.R. §
202.1 (1974).
2817 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
"U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
"1H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909). The Supreme Court, too, has
described the constitutional purpose of the copyright clause: "The economic philoso-
phy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant ... copyrights is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors ... in '... useful Arts.'" Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
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ensure an adequate return on their copyrighted works, thereby en-
couraging authors to continue to produce, while not being so anticom-
petitive as to be detrimental to the public interest. The monopoly
granted by the Copyright Act was intended to be broad enough to
provide copyright holders with just rewards for their efforts without
unduly hampering competition. Thus, while competition is generally
to be promoted, Congress recognized that in copyright matters the
greater public interest was in the creation of new intellectual works,
and that such restraints on competition as were necessary to insure
that copyright holders received sufficient remuneration for such
works actually furthered this public interest.
In applying the Goldstein-Kewanee pre-emption analysis, a de-
termination must be made of whether state law conflicts with these
federal objectives of the Copyright Act. State protection for intellec-
tual works which stimulates further creation while not substantially
burdening competition would be in accord with federal goals in the
copyright field. If it is found that state application of the misappro-
priation doctrine to the controversy between cable television and the
broadcast-copyright interests properly preserves the incentives of
producers to create new programming99 without substantially com-
promising the federal policy favoring competition, the state remedy
should be allowed.
In dealing with matters covered by the archaic federal copyright
statute, the courts applying state law may find themselves in a posi-
tion to mold the misappropriation doctrine to complement congres-
sional policies. Courts implementing the 1909 Act are limited to pro-
tecting only those exclusive rights enumerated in § 1 of the Act, and
have accordingly found themselves bound by the outdated language.
Indeed, it can be argued that the courts in Teleprompter and
Fortnightly were too preoccupied with construing the word "perform"
as used in the Copyright Act to look to the policy embodied in the
Act and the Constitution. 0
Courts applying state law, on the other hand, will not be affirma-
tively limited, as were the courts in Teleprompter and Fortnightly,
to any particular statutory wording of copyright protection. State
"A copyright holder may be able to demonstrate that cable importation of a signal
from a distant market, embodying one of his copyrighted programs, has deprived him
of a certain amount of revenue which is necessary if the copyright holder's operation
is to be profitable, thereby allowing him to continue in operation. See note 58 supra.
1"In his Teleprompter dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas criticized the majority for
taking a too formalistic approach rather than seeking to promote the policy objectives
of the Copyright Act. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415
U.S. 394, 417-19 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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remedies will be limited only in the negative sense that such protec-
tion must not interfere with federal policy. Broadly read, the
Goldstein-Kewanee pre-emption test should allow state law affecting
copyright matters to stand so long as it does not contravene any
particular federal policy and is not specifically pre-empted by stat-
ute. Such a methodology would give the states power to protect works
left beyond the specific provisions of the 1909 Act, so long as this
protection is consistent with the policies implied by the Act.
The questions raised by state remedies for cable television misap-
propriation, however, go beyond those answered in Goldstein and
Kewanee. There is a difference in the relationships between state and
federal law in those cases and the nature of state protection appropri-
ate to the cable television context. Goldstein validated a state law
which, in effect, filled a vacuum, as no federal protection was avail-
able for sound recordings at that time. In Kewanee, on the other
hand, a federal patent was available, but the inventor chose not to
patent his invention but to rely instead upon the alternative protec-
tion of state trade secret law. The two forms of protection, federal
patent and state trade secret, were alternatives. To seek protection
under one of the laws would essentially preclude recourse to the
other. 10' In the case of state misappropriation protection for copy-
righted television programs, however, the misappropriation protec-
tion afforded by the state would be cumulative. The copyrighted
programs are accorded certain protections under federal law."'2 Thus,
state misappropriation protection would be in addition to the broad-
casters' rights under their federal statutory copyright.
For such cumulative protection to be permissible, the state rem-
edy must not defeat policies established by Congress. Those seeking
a remedy under state law must show that the protections available
to the copyright holder under the archaic Copyright Act fall short of
the congressional objectives underlying the Act. It must be demon-
strated that the rights provided by the specific language of the Act
do not assure the copyright holder the necessary incentive envisioned
'State trade secret protection would not be available for a patented article or
process because federal law requires full disclosure as a precondition to patent protec-
tion. Had Kewanee's process been patented it would no longer be secret, and therefore
would not be protectible as a trade secret. Furthermore, since Kewanee's process of
growing crystals had been in commercial use for more than one year, during which time
Kewanee relied on state trade secret protection, it had lost its eligibility for patent
protection. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970). See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470, 473-75 (1974).
'1"The exclusive rights granted to copyright holders are enumerated in § 1 of the
Copyright Act. See note 5 supra.
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by the Congress to encourage intellectual creations. Broadcasters and
copyright holders may be able to demonstrate that cable carriage of
their programs diminishes the financial rewards of production to such
an extent that cable transmission becomes a distinctive disincentive
to further creation. Further, it may be argued by those parties seeking
state protection for copyrighted programming that the state misap-
propriation remedy supplies the incentive to creation envisioned by
the 1909 Congress in its Copyright Act. Relief provided by the misap-
propriation doctrine would remunerate the broadcast-copyright in-
terests for damage caused by cable television, and thereby remove the
disincentive to further creation and dissemination of programming
resulting from detrimental cable transmission of broadcast signals.
Federal copyright policy is not the only pre-emptive hurdle that
must be passed, however, before the states may apply the misappro-
priation doctrine to cable television. The federal government has a
substantial interest in telecommunication, particularly in light of the
interstate nature of such communication, and, as a result, both
broadcast and cable television are heavily regulated by the Federal
Communications Commission. State protections for broadcasters and
copyright holders must not trench upon the policies embodied in the
federal regulatory scheme in the television field. Even though the
FCC thoroughly regulates the activities of cable television,, 3 the
Ninth Circuit in Cable Vision held, in accordance with the Federal
Communications Act of 1934,1-4 that the implementation of the fed-
eral policies of the Communications Act does not grant cable televi-
sion immunity from claims of unfair competition. 5 Nevertheless, the
states should be sensitive to the objectives of the federal telecommun-
ications policy, should protection from cable television be provided
to broadcasters and copyright holders. Both the copyright laws and
the television regulations were designed to promote the public bene-
fit. Television regulation should encourage greater availability of pro-
gramming to the public, and any remedy granted in a misappropria-
tion suit against a cable system should be formulated with such an
objective in mind." 8
State courts applying misappropriation law might offer several
1347 C.F.R. §§ 76.1 et seq. (1973).
1047 U.S.C. § 414 (1970). The section provides that: "Nothing in this chapter
contained shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law
or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies."
'0 Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348, 349-50 (9th Cir. 1964). See also
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 419-20 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
" Cf. Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945).
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alternative forms of relief. The court might award monetary dam-
ages, call for an accounting of profits made by the cable television
system as a result of the unauthorized carriage of broadcast signals,
or perhaps grant injunctive relief. It is both in the form and amount
of relief granted that state law may run counter to federal policies.
Monetary damages should be awarded with the objective of providing
a copyright holder with a sufficient return to be an incentive to fur-
ther programming production. However, at the same time the court
should be careful not to impede competition unnecessarily by seeing
that monetary judgments do not prove so burdensome to the cable
system that they result in a substantial curtailment of service. The
public has an interest in the continued vitality of cable television,
especially in those localities in which the cable provides a substantial
portion of the television available. An accounting of profits unfairly
accrued by the cable system is a desirable mode of relief, but it may
be difficult to determine the extent to which the carriage of copy-
righted programming siphons off profits from broadcasters and other
rightful claimants.
More difficult- questions arise where injunctive relief is concerned.
First, FCC regulations allow, and even require, cable carriage of cer-
tain broadcast stations. To enjoin a cable system from fulfilling its
obligations under the FCC rules would directly conflict with these
federal regulations and the important telecommunications policies
underlying them, and should therefore be avoided. Second, the states
must be careful not to impede the flow of interstate commerce. The
Goldstein Court found that since applicability of state copyright-like
protection was limited to the boundaries of the individual states,
such remedies would have minimal adverse effects on interstate com-
merce." 7 However, cable systems often import signals across state
borders. State proscription of cable access to such signals might ad-
versely affect telecommunications policy to an impermissible extent,
at least insofar as that policy reflects regulation of interstate com-
merce. If, however, the courts are sensitve to these matters, remedies
could be fashioned which would promote, rather than impede, federal
policies-and which would as a result be permissible."'8
If the broadcasters and copyright holders are able to demonstrate
detrimental economic effects caused by cable television carriage of
1"412 U.S. at 558.
,"As with any law affecting the activities of the media and the press, there may
be first amendment limitations on governmental rulemaking in the copyright area as
well as the constitutional issues mentioned above. For a discussion of the perplexing
paradox of the relationship of the first amendment and the copyright clause see 2
NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.2 (1974).
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copyrighted programming which threaten to defeat the incentives
envisioned by the Copyright Act and the Constitution, the aggrieved
parties may be able to secure a certain amount of protection from
state law. Such relief, however, is at best limited. The optimum
solution to the cable-copyright controversy lies in the long awaited
general revision of the federal copyright laws. Such a revision bill,
settling the current controversy and providing the means to resolve
future, unforeseen difficulties, should be expeditiously enacted.
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